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Abstract 
The board of directors , risk and financial stability are important variables in the banking literature . Indeed , they 
are important for shareholders and other stakeholders of the bank .In this article , we have studied a sample of 40 
banks ( 20 Islamic banks and 20 conventional banks ) in GCC countries over the period (2006…2012).We found 
that only the presence of institutional investors on the board of directors influence the financial stability of 
conventional banks . The Islamic banks are more stable when the debt ratio is low . The bank size has a positive 
but not significant impact on the financial stability of Islamic banks . This effect is negative on financial stability 
of conventional banks . 
Keywords: board of directors , Islamic banks , conventional banks , risk , financial stability  
 
Introduction  
Governance takes a very important aspect Islamic bank to the context that it has an important on financial 
stability , especially that Islamic banks have recently emerged on the financial sphere , have shown some 
remarkable strength during the period of the financial crisis in 2008. 
Empirical studies considering the relationship between internal governance mechanisms ,mainly the 
board and ownership structure , and financials stability are very limited in the case of banks in emerging 
countries .( Arun and Turner ( 2004)). 
In addition , risk management in Islamic banks depends on internal and external factors to these a 
banks . The last possess a very relative control over external factors such as current and future economic 
activity .if banks can not influence external factors , good risk management can be involved in the interior of the 
bank . Several empirical studies that address the board affect on the stability and the bank giving rise to 
divergent results . 
Board size , the presence of independent and institutional administrators can also have a positive or 
negative effect on financial stability and the bank risk . 
Our empirical work is based on the recent literature , building on the main work concerned with the 
impact of board on financial stability and the risk of Islamic banks . Our research will be based on a comparative 
study between Islamic banks and conventional banks . 
 
Section 1: Literature Review  
The Islamic banking environment has seen many changes that drive the development of the role of the board and 
its impact on risk and financial stability . Indeed , several studies have addressed the effect of characteristics of 
board of directors ( such as size , institutional administrators , and duality ) on risk in Islamic banks . 
The specific characteristics of banks makes their governance different form that of companies. Banks 
are distinguished by high opacity procreate by information asymmetry ( Barth , Caprio , Levine ( 2002)) , high 
debt level ( Macey and Ohara ( 2003)) and strong regulation ( Prowse ( 1997)). 
The different characteristics diminish the role of external governance mechanisms . However , in banks , 
control seems to review the internal governance mechanisms that reduce risk ( Lopez ( 2010)) and ensure 
financial stability ( Salas , Saurina ( 2003)). 
According to Lopez ( 2010) , bank governance is the first instrument of holding risk control banking 
activities and in particular , risk fall to shareholders and the board of directors . 
The bank risk management and control belong essential to shareholders and the board of administration .  
Members to the board play an important role in controlling the activity of banks and risk management . 
In addition , the ultimate responsibility of risk management of the bank is held by the board. 
It must defines the operational guidelines and take responsibility for the bank’s soundness . (Van 
Grenning , Bratanovic ( 2004).So , the board has to control risk taking by executives . 
According to Edward and al ( 2008) , the board of administration has considered a major player in the 
process of government banking company that provides management direction for the organization , defines the 
objectives and strategies of the bank and evaluates the performance of leaders . 
And for a person to be a board member of directors , it must have some personal characteristics . 
Indeed , it must have knowledge and skills , develop fidelity , completeness , self respect , the discipline , 
generosity , willingness to learn , independence , impartiality , experience , authority , passion , assiduity , merit 
the confidence . 
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According to Levine ( 2004) , the board plays a key role in the banking sector . Given the opacity of 
banking activities and the existence of deposit insurance , the control exercised by the board is much greater than 
that of others . 
Macy and Ohara ( 2003) show that the role of board of directors is more interesting than other 
companies because the features are responsible fiduciary to depositors , shareholders and regulators . According 
to Summer and Webb ( 2005) , the board of directors examines bank and credit policies , it is considered an 
important monitor to the leadership and guiding directions of the bank and their implementations . 
The structure of board of directors can also influence risk strategies taken by leaders . The inefficiency 
of the control of the directors is a major cause of failures of banks and financial instability . 
In a report published in 2006 entitled “ Enhancing corporate governance for banking organizations “ , 
the Basel committee said that the board has great importance in creating a good bank governance . It said that the 
board of directors has attracted the attention of many researchers studying the impact of this mechanism on 
performance , few of them are interested in the influence of board of directors on risk and financial stability in 
banks . 
In our study , we identified a set of variables supposed to explain the impact of board of directors on 
risk and financial stability of Islamic banks . We select those that seem better characterize the bank of the Gulf 
countries , each of these variables resulted in a separate case . 
 
1-1 The size of the board  
Many financial studies have highlighted the importance of size of board of directors and its impact on risk and 
financial stability in conventional banks . However , very little research have focused on the impact of this 
phenomenon on the risk in Islamic banks . 
Moreover , a better quality of decision making and a better understanding and management of 
environment are essential factors in determining a board of directors . 
According to  Wasiazzaman ( 2013) , extensive board leads to a better relationship of the company with 
its environment and control leader . 
Each director has an idea about the functioning of the company and its environment and the appropriate 
means for the bank to the financial stability . So , the higher the number of directors increases , the information 
asymmetry decreases . So , if the size of the board is  important , so the information asymmetry will decrease 
through coordination between administrators and the cost of transactions will fall through the reduction of risk . 
Simpson and Gleason ( 1999) found that the number of directors have significant impact on the risk of 
financial distress . Besides , Summer and Webb ( 2005) show that the board structure affects credits policies . 
Pathan ( 2000) found that the risk has a positive effect on the productivity of board of directors . 
This efficiency is captured by the small size of board of directors and strong independence of directors . 
Beltratti and Stulz( 2000) show that small size o the board of directors affects the risk and negatively 
affect the financial stability of bank . So , in the banking sector , a small size of board of directors is 
accompanied by a significant risk . 
On the one hand , shareholders are encouraged to take risk excessive at the expense of other 
stakeholders . Furthermore and in accordance with the theory of resource dependence, expertise and diversity of 
a large number of directors brings a better assessment of risk undertake and thus reduction of risk . 
Against the current , Adams and Mehran ( 2005) conclude that banks , having a large board are more 
stable than other banks . 
Therefore , we can conclude that large board enhance financial stability of banks . 
H1: The board size has a negative effect on the risk and a positive effect on the financial stability of bank . 
 
1-2 The independence of board of directors  
Independence in board is a form of innovation in Islamic banks . Adam and Mehran ( 2005) note that this 
independence allows companies focus on their core business , change their fixed costs and variable costs and 
achieve economies of scale . 
However , several authors state that outside directors are not able to understand the difficulty of the 
company ‘s business and they are not competent officers in the exercise of control and monitor leaders . 
So , they may have divergent interests , which can create conflict of interests between the board of 
directors and the management team . Moreover ,  Griffith and al ( 2002) find no relationship between stability 
and the board composition and confirm the results of Pi and Timme ( 1993). 
Similarly , Adams and Mehran ( 2005) reveal that the percentage of outside directors has no effect on 
the financial stability of banks . So , we list the second hypothesis  
H2: The presence of independent directors in the board of directions has no influence on the stability of 
banks  
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1-3 The presence of institutional investors  
According Whidbee ( 1997) , institutional investors are very active in the control of the management team , they 
are encouraged to monitor managers and reduce conflicts between shareholders and creditors . 
They can help to reduction of bank risk taking . Thus , the presence of and administrator institutional in 
the bank’s board of director is an effective means of control of the management of banking activities , given the 
expertise and competitiveness that they brings. 
Whidbee ( 1997) found that the proposition of outside director is higher in banks where institutional 
investor hold significant share of capital . Theoretically , two theories on the role of institutional administrators 
in banking risk management clash : according to the thesis of activism that relies on the theory of agency , 
institutional administrator can control effectively the decision of leaders . 
He has the skills , knowledge and experience appropriate to effectively manage the risk .And according 
passivity thesis , institutional administrator does not control effectivews thly the bank policy . 
The theoretical debate did not result in a consensus empirically , we list the following hypothesis : 
H 3: the presence of institutional directors in the board makes the bank more stable and less risky . 
 
1-4 Duality  
We note scarcity of research that focus on the relationship between duality , risk and financial stability of banks . 
Simpson and Gleason ( 1999) show that the combination of the position of executive officer ( CEO ) and the 
board chairman of directors is the only factor that has a significant negative impact on the probability of 
financial distress of banks . 
They state that the council chairperson of directors is the principal officer of the bank , tends to less risk 
to preserve its human capital . They also explain that management in more risk averse nature and when he directs 
also the board , he will be less aligned with shareholders interests . 
Godlewski (2005) shows that the authority granted by the CEO duality is linked negatively to risk 
taking in banks . If the CEO of the bank has more authority and ability to monitor the decisions of the board , the 
bank would be exposed to less risk . 
He proves that like any investor , the bank manager has a portfolio of tangible financial assets and 
human capital installed in the bank that he governs . However , unlike other investors , it must preserve its 
internally portfolio by participating in low risk projects . 
We see than that the relationship between the conclusion of the functions of chairman of the board and 
the CEO is not resolved. Similarly , results of studies , focusing mainly on Islamic banks , deviating from this 
one who notice the risk management where there is a combination of functions , and those who see a risk 
reduction . 
We state the following hypothesis : 
H4: Duality in the board of directors has no influence on the financial stability and the risk of Islamic 
banks . 
 
1-5 Debt ratio  
The debt ratio is a ratio defined as the ratio of total debt to total assets , expressed as a percentage . It can be 
interpreted as the proportion of the assets of a bank which is financed by debt . 
The debt ratio is a measurement unit for comparing the total amount disposer after paying taxes and 
social contributions ( what experts call disponible income ) and the total amount of debts . 
Credits institutions use this unit to assess repayment capacity ( solvency ) . 
 A US university study published in September 2012 , proposed to compare the efficiency and stability 
of Islamic banks are higher than those found in conventional banks . However , Islamic banks have superior of 
services provided by financial intermediaries not charged to customers and have on their balance sheet improved 
asset quality . 
These last two elements justify a little better resistance of Islamic banks facing financial crisis. 
Hence the following hypothesis : 
H5: The higher the debt ratio is low ( high solvency ) , the more the bank is financially stable and less 
risky  
 
1-6 Size of bank  
According to Godlewski ( 2005) , the bank size is measured by the total assets at the end of each year . It is 
considered as a control variable because it can have an effect on the level of capital , risk , performance and 
profitability of banks though economies of scale . 
The effect of bank size on risk and financial stability is very debated among researchers . It is possible 
to divide them into 2 categories those whose think that size has a positive effect on the risk and those who 
believe a negative effect . 
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According to the research of Saunders and al ( 1990) , there is a negative relationship between bank risk 
and the bank size . They explain this result by the fact that large banks are suceptible to be more skilled in risk 
management and also better opportunities for diversification . 
Thus , we expect that the size of the bank is negatively related to the level of risk . Indeed , the major 
banks should have less risk because they have the ability to hold more diversified portfolios . Also , the large 
banks have a higher quality of diversification of risk than small banks . 
Hence , the is is the following hypothesis : 
H6: Large banks are riskier and less financially stable  
 
1-7 Inflation  
According to Kok and al ( 2012) , several studies have been done to determine the relationship between inflation 
and financial profitability of banks . The first author who bows on the issue of inflation was Revel ( 1980) . He 
considered that inflation could be a factor that influence on banking stability . 
This hypothesis was tested empirically by Boyd , Levine , Smith (2000) . These authors used multiple 
regression techniques in their study and found that there is a strong non linear relationship between inflation and 
the financial sector and the risk in bank . 
They concluded that inflation is statistically significant and negatively related to financial sector 
stability . So , we expect a higher risk . Others authors who were content to inflation , as Molyneux and Thornton 
(1992) , found a positive effect and statistical significant . 
According to Vong and Chan (2009) , inflation has a positive impact on Islamic banks . Ever , if the 
banks do not take into account interest rates in their operations , an accurate forecast of changes in inflation 
would help to determine the profit sharing rate , this brought about an increase in their profits . 
But Perry ( 1992) said that the effect of inflation on the banking sector performance dependence on its 
characteristics to be planned or unplanned . 
Finally , inflation is an important determinant of banking stability . Generally , high inflation rates are 
associated with higher interest rates of credits and thus high incomes . 
Hence , there is the following hypothesis : 
H7: Inflation influences positively the financials stability of banks  
 
Section 2: Empirical study  
Recall that our research topic proposes to find elements of response to the questions about the impact of board of 
directors on risk and financial stability of Islamic banks , and since we will compare Islamic banks to banks 
conventional . 
Our sample was selected on the conditions to be representative of the country where there is high 
concentration of Islamic  banks with a significant weight in the financial sector. 
2-1 Presentation of the sample  
Our sample was selected on the conditions to be representative of the country where there is high concentration 
of Islamic banks with a significant weight in the financial sector . Thus we considered Islamic banks and 
conventional banks operating in the Gulf countries . 
Data are collected from the base Bankscope and world bank ( 2013) . Our sample consists of 20 islamic 
banks and 20 conventional banks over a period of 7 years which runs from (2006…2012) and whose name is 
shown in table below : 
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Table1: List of Islamic banks and conventional banks  




















Arab National bank  
Al  Riyad  
Samba 
The Saoudi British Bank 
Arab banking corporation  
Bahrain Middle East Bank  
Invest corp Bank  
Taieb Bank  
United Gulf bank 
United Gulf investment  




Bahrein Islamic ban 
Al Baraka  
Gulf Finance House  
Sharja Islamic bank  
Abou Dhabi Islamic bank  
NBOD 
Qatar Inter Islamic bank  
Qatar Islamic bank  
Amalk Islamic bank  
Qatar Islamic bank 
Dubai Islamic bank 
Tawefel 
GH BANK  
Al salam Sudan bank 
Al salam Bahrain bank 
E Islamic bank 
Kwait international bank 
Borbayan 
Kwait Finance House  
 
2-2 Definition of variables  
In the model , we will consider the financial stability and risk as endogenous variables ( variables to explain ) , 
exogenous variables ( predictors) ,  
The dependent variable ( financial stability and risk ) : 
According to Iqbal ( 2012) , the most related variable in the literature to measure the banking stability is 
the Zscore . 
Thus , the primary dependent variable is the Z score used as measure of the sability and Islamic banking 
risk . 
The Z score analysis is a method of failure prediction that is generally used as a measure of financial 
distress . 
The Z score can be summarized as follows :  
Z=K+U/σ 
K: Capital and reserves in percentage of assets  
U: the average yield percentage of assets  
σ: Standard deviation of return of assets used as volatility indicator  
The Z score measures the number of standard deviation as a realization of return falls to expense equity 
under the bank performance normally assumption . In addition , Z score indicates a low limit of the risk of 
insolvency . 
An impact feature of Z score is that it is a fairly objective measure of strength between different group 
of financial institutions , because it emphasizes the risk of insolvency , on the risk that a bank( whether 
commercial , Islamic or other ) uses its capital and reserves . 
The Z score also applies to banks that use a high risk strategy / high efficiency and those that use a 
performance strategy low risk /line , provided that these strategies lead to the same adjustement risk / return . 
If an institution chooses to have lower risk adjusted returns , it can still have a Z score if it has a higher 
market capitalization . In this sense , the Zscore provides an objective measure of the strength . 
           Ki,t+Ui,t 
Zi,t=------------------*100% 
              σi,t 
K = equity including reserves  
U : return of assets  
σ: Standard deviation of return of assets  
The explanatory variables  
-The size of the board : TLA : total number of directors  
-The independence of board of directors : INB: Number of independent directors  
-Institutional administrators : Number of institutional directors on the board of directors  
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Duality ( DA)  
Number of CEO positive or board president of administration / total position administrators  
Control variables  
-The debt ratio ( ED): is calculated by dividing the total liabilities of the bank ( long term and short term ) by 
total assets  
The optimal debt ratio is determined by the same proportion of liabilities and equity that the  
If the ratio is below 0.5 , then most of the bank assets is financed by equity  
If the ratio  is greater than 0.5  most of the assets is financed by debt , the normal value is between 0.6 and 0.7 
The size ( TA) 
It is measured by the total of the bank’s assets . It is considered a control variables because it can affect the level 
of risk and financial stability of the Islamic banks . 
Size i,t = assets i,t /Somme assetsi,t *100% 
Inflation ( INF) 
Inflation is the phenomenon of generalized price increases , and thus corresponds to a temporary declined in the 
value of the currency . 




Our work is inspired by the theory and previous empirical work dealing with the financial stability of islamic 
banks . More precisely , our aim is to study , years of the context of the Gulf countries in banks , the impact of 
board of directors on risk and financial stability of Islamic banks . 
For the model of development of our research , we referred to the study of Cihak and Hesee (2008) , we 
consider the following model to estimate the financial stability of Islamic banks and new banks . 
 
Z= dependent variable = measure of bank stability  
TCA = Variable of size of board of directors  
AINS= Number of institutional directors in board of directors  
DUAL= number of posts of CEO or directors of board chairman / total professional posts  
IND= Number of independent directors  
END= ratio debt  
INF= inflation rate  
TA= size of bank 
E= error term  
i=1….40( individual dimension ) 
t=2006…2012( temporal dimension )  
The stata 12 software was used to estimate the model of our research . 
 
2-4 The econometric tests  
2-4-1 The homogeneity test  
To examine a panel data sample , it must first check the homogeneity or heterogeneity of data generation 
process . In the practical part , this amounts to verifying the equivalence of the model coefficients explored in the 
individual dimension . 
In the economic context , the test of homogeneity allows us to have an idea on the theoretical model 
studied if it is exactly the same for all banks or conversely if exists the specify for each firm . 
The homogeneity test is used to test the overall coherence of model , it also serves as a global 
significance test . The assumption of this test are follows : 
H0: The variable coefficients are not different from zero 
H1: The variable coefficients are different from zero  
2-4-2 The fixed effect model  
This model , also called model of covariance , was introduced by Mendlek in 1973 on a fairly solid foundation . 
When economic agent optimize , they can’t ignore the value of the individual effect and take it into account in 
their decisions . 
This may involve , in many cases , the individual effect is correlated with the explanatory variables . 
The estimator generalized least squares would therefore converge more . Model with a fixed effect challenges 
the assumption of independence between the individual effect and the explanatory variables of the 
model .( Duguet ( 2010)) . 
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2-4-3 The  random effect model  
The model , also known as model compounds errors , was introduced by Balestra and Nerlove in 1966. It 
consists of introducing an individual effect in the model of disruption. This implies that the estimate by OLS is 
not optimum . 
Moreover , statistics test deducted form the usual formulas are no longer valid so the need to modify the 
calculation of the covariance matrix of the estimator . 
The solution lies in the application of generalized least squares . However , to enable implementation 
this estimator . We must first estimate the covariance matrix of the disturbances of the model compounds errors : 
which means to introduce two other estimators . 
The inter-individual estimator ( Between ) 
The intra individual estimator ( Within ) 
2-4-4 The test of Breush Pagan  
The test of Breush Pagan was presented by Trevor Breush and Adrian Pagan in article published in 1979 in revue 
Econometrica . 
It can test the hypothesis of homoscedasticity of the error term of  a linear regression model . 
Breush Pagan test is intended to show whether to apply the estimator MCO or estimator MCG . Estimater MCG 
is used when there are individual random effect and OLS otherwise. 
This is a Lagrange multiplier test . 
The null hypothesis : H0: σ2U=0 
The alternative hypothesis : H 1:σ2U different from 0 
2-4-5 Hausman test  
The huasman test is attributed to D Minwer , Jay Hausman , James Durbin . 
The test Hausman , also known as Wu  Hausman test or the test of Durbin Wa Hausman , is a statistical test used 
to compare econometric estimator under the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis is an efficient 
estimator in the null hypothesis but not converge under the alternative hypothesis . 
In a linear regression model on panel data , test of Hausman used to test the difference between the 
fixed effect model , assumed to converge under the null hypothesis and the alternative hypothesis , and the 
random effect model , assumed convergent and efficient under the null hypothesis but not converge under the 
alternative hypothesis .( Hausman J A ( 1978)). 
The test specification of Hausman ( 1978) is a general test that can be applied to many specifications 
problems in econometrics , dealing slows down the rending of endogeneity . Its most common application is that 
of specification test of individual random effect panel. 
The test specification of Hausman based on the following estimations body . 
The estimations of model errors compounds are effective :  
H0: E ( Ui/Xi) = 0 
H1: E ( Ui/Xi) different from 0 ( the estimations of model errors compounds are biaised )  
The Hausman specification test can choose between the fixed effect model and the random effect 
model . 
One proceeds to 4 steps : 
1-Apply the fixed effects model as demonstrated previously  
2-On safeguard the estimate obtained from the fixed effects model as the fixed  
3-Applying the error model compounds on the same variable  
4-Applying the test of Hausman  
 
2-5 The research results and interpretations  
To test the validity of our model , we first conducted a descriptive analysis : 
1-Descriptive analysis  
Results of analysis are shown in the following table : 
Table 2: descriptive statistics of Islamic banks  
Variables  Observations Mean  Standard deviation  Minimum Maximum 
X 140 0.27 0.39 -0.0122 3.65 
Tca 140 11.192 1.46 6 14 
Ains 140 0.265 0.177 0 0.63 
Dual 140 0.6 0.49 0 1 
Ind 140 0.500 0.201 0.166 0.92 
Endet 140 0.708 0.203 0.061 1.23 
Inf 140 0.0508 0.041 -0.05 0.15 
Ta 140 16.17 2.02 12.44 21.014 
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Table 3: Descriptive statistics of conventional banks  
Variable  Observations Mean Standard 
deviation  
Minimum Maximum 
X 140 0.3291 0.4436 0.013 1.27 
Tca 140 10.52 1.42 7 12 
Ains 140 0.26 0.2160 0 0.91 
Dual 140 0.66 0.473 0 1 
Ind 140 0.549 0.185 0.11 1 
Endet 140 0.521 0.53 0.0034 0.656 
Inf 140 0.0373 0.029 0.004 0.129 
Ta 140 15.64 2.69 10.0525 19.51 
During the study period , the average measure of financial stability Z score of Islamic banks is 0.2702% 
against 0.3291% for conventional banks . Furthermore , the average debt ratio is equal to 0.708% and 0.821% 
respectively for Islamic banks and conventional banks . 
The found figures indicate that Islamic banks are less stable than conventional banks because they are 
less protected against the risk , despite the fact that they are less leveraged than conventional banks . 
 
2-Anaylsis of correlation between variables  
The correlation matrix comprises correlation of several variables there between , the coefficients indicate the 
influence of variables have on each other . The study of this matrix makes it possible to detect the existence of 
absence of multi-colinearity problem . 
The study of the intensity of the correlation between the explanatory variables is a prerequisite to the 
estimation results of analysis to ensure that they are not likely to bias the results of the regressions . 
Indeed the main source of difficulty in the interpretation of results is the multicolinearity between 
variables . 
The correlation matrix is one of the tools that allows the levels of correlation detection between 
different pairs of variables . 
Table 4: Correlation matrix of variables in Islamic banks  
 X tca Ainx dual ind endet inf ta 
X 1.000        
Tca 0.2781 1.000       
Ainx -0.0755 0.17 1.000      
Dual -0.1859 -0.19 -0.1112 1.000     
Ind 0.1311 0.0955 -0.5261 0.0517 1.000    
Endet -0.1584 -0.1304 -0.027 0.0382 -0.1725 1.000   
Inf -0.1453 -0.23 -0.26 -0.1394 -0.0303 -0.0617 1.000  
Ta 0.3014 0.1041 -0.36 -0.0706 0.3039 -0.0505 0.2241 1.000 
 
Table 5: Correlation matrix of variables in conventional banks  
 X tca Ainx dual ind endet inf ta 
X 1.000        
Tca -0.1377 1.000       
Ainx 0.0022 -0.2422 1.000      
Dual 0.1075 0.1692 -0.2392 1.000     
Ind -0.1466 -0.0165 0.2992 -0.2735 1.000    
Endet 0.0670 -0.0414 -0.0251 -0.954 0.0356 1.000   
Inf -0.0724 -0.0315 -0.0616 0.0229 0.066 0.0515 1.000  
Ta 0.0757 -0.2634 0.2021 -0.0469 0.2907 0.21 0.27 1.000 
The collinearity problem between the variables used in regression can be detected according to 
Kennedy ( 1992) by observing a correlation coefficient greater than 80% for a couple of variables data . 
The correlation matrixes presented above are calculated for all the Islamic and conventional banks 
studied . Referring the results of the correlation matrix , we find that several variables correlate with them 
without exceeding the multicolinearity threshold of 80% . 
Thus , we find that the correlations between the explanatory variables ( independent variables ) are low . 
There is not problem of multicolinearity . So , in that case we will introduce all variables in the same model . 
Test of VIF ( variance inflation factor ) 
The second solution for detecting a multicollinearity problem is to regress each explanatory variables on others . 
By performing the calculation ( 1-R2) from each of the regressions carried out , it is possible to know how much 
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the variance of an explanatory variable is independent of other variables . 
The calculation of ( 1/1-R2) then affords a VIF statistic for each variable . Multicolinearity problem is 
raised when a VIF has a value greater than or equal to 10. 
Table6 : Results of test VIF for Islamic banks  
Variable  VIF 1/VIF 
Ains 1.81 0.553101 
Ind 1.59 0.628813 
Ta 1.28 0.784211 
Inf 1.24 0.804120 
Tca 1.22 0.819696 
Endet 1.11 0.898008 
Dual 1.10 0.907245 
Mean VIF 1.34  
 
Table7 : Results of test VIF for conventional banks  
Varaible  VIF 1/VIF 
Ta 1.37 0.729863 
Ind 1.27 0.787826 
Ains 1.22 0.816978 
Tca 1.18 0.847015 
Dual 1.16 0.861341 
Inf 1.10 0.905856 
Endet 1.07 0.935079 
Mean VIF 1.20  
The results of test VIF shows the absence of multiconlinearity test , confirming the results generated in 
the correlation matrixes  
 
3-Estimation results  
The model of our research is estimated o the assumption of uniformity of behavior over time and among banks . 
We estimate the model by the method of MCO assuming that the error is identical and follows the normal 
distribution N( 0,σ2). 
The specification of the model presented implies that the coefficients are the same for 40 banks 
considered . 
It is possible to think that there are differences between the banks in their activities and their operations .  
It is appropriate to adopt a specification showing the individual effect , that is why was take the specification of 
our research by introducing heterogeneity among banks . 
We assume that the coefficients are identical behavior between banks and invariant in time , with the 
exception of the constant which we assume that is specific for each bank . We see once again that error are 
identical and follow the normal loi N ( 0, 62) . 
The concern at this point whether the hypothesis of heterogeneity between banks in term of their 
financial stability is validated or not . To test this hypothesis , we carry the test Fisher constructed as follows : 
under the assumption of homogeneity of firms ( H0: α1=α2=….α40), the estimated model matches the model 
with common effects while under the hypothesis of the presence of heterogeneity ( αi different from αj) , the 
model estimated is the model to individual effects . 
The stata software proceeds directly to the implementation  of the Fisher test when estimating the fixed 
effect model . The reading of fisher test lead to reject the hypothesis H0 . So it seems that there specific 
individual effects to each bank and explain financial stability . 
We must now choose between individual fixed effects model ( within à , where we assume that the 
specific effects may be correlated with the explanatory variables , the individual random effect model 
( between )  , where we assume that the specific effects are orthogonal to the explanatory variables . 
The Hausman specification test ( Hausman ( 1978)) is used to test which of these 2 hypothesis is 
appropriate with data . By performing the fisher test ( F test ) and that of Breush and  Pagan Lagrangien 
Multiplier ( LM) , we recognize the rejection of a perfectly uniform panel structure and therefore our model is 
either fixed individual effects , or individual effects random , either random effect model . 
While the random effect model should be preferred methodological reasons , its use in the case of the 
estimation of a financial stability function is rejected for Islamic banks . According to Hausman test , the fixed 
effect model seems most appropriate since it best the data structure of Islamic banks . 
However , the random effect model seems adequate for conventional banks . Depending on the value of 
Research Journal of Finance and Accounting                                                                                                                                    www.iiste.org 
ISSN 2222-1697 (Paper) ISSN 2222-2847 (Online) 
Vol.7, No.14, 2016 
 
90 
the Fisher F statistic , also displayed in the tables of estimations , the results of the test are presented Hausman 
specified in next tables  . 
Table8 : Results of specification test for Islamic banks  
Estimated model  Result of Hausman test  
Z= f ( tca , ains , dual , ind , endet , inf , ta) Fixed effects  
 
Table9 : Results of specification test for conventional banks  
Estimated model  Result of Hausman test  
Z = f ( tca , ains , dual , ind , endet , inf , ta) Random effects  
We will present the empirical results of our study . The interpretations of the results will enable us to 
exploit the sign and magnitude of the estimated relationship . 
Table10 : Estimation results for Islamic banks  












Table11 : Estimation results for conventional banks  









We will present the empirical results of our study . The interpretations of the results will enable us to 
exploit the sign and magnitude of the estimated relationship . 
We estimate different equations on the period ( 2006…2012) 
Based on the results of table 10 , we find that there are only 3 explanatory variables that are 
significantly  . There are ( size of board , duality , inflation ) which significantly impact the financial stability ( Z 
score ) of Islamic banks at the 1% , 5% , and 10% . 
The estimation results show a negative and significant relationship between the size of board and the 
financial stability of Islamic banks , which is a rejection of the hypothesis H1 of our research . 
This result does not support the result found by Adams and Mehran ( 2005) who concluded that Islamic 
banks with a large board are more stable than other banks . This result also comes in contradiction with that 
found by Blanchard and Dionne ( 2004) who suggested that more the number of directors increases , the use of 
sophisticated instruments for cover against the risk increases , justifying the excessive risk taking by managers . 
It turned out as well as large board deteriorates the stability of banks and therefore increases the risk 
exposure . 
Thus , the more the size of board increases , the risk is important . Regarding conventional banks , 
estimates of the results ( table) show that board size has a positive but not significant effect on the financial 
stability of these banks . 
We conclude that a high size of board could help better assess of the risk of investments projects , due 
to the diversified structure and the best expertise that characterizes a large size board , which reduce the risk of 
conventional banks . 
Thus , these results are corroborated with that found by Wasiazzman ( 2013) note that an extended 
board leads to a better relationship with their corporate environments and control for leaders . 
Therefore , each director has an idea about the functioning of the company , its environment and the 
suitable means for the bank to be effective , efficient and financially stable . So the more the number of directors 
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increases , the company manage to reduce the information asymmetry . 
The estimation results show that the independence of board of directors has not a significant effect on 
the stability of Islamic and conventional banks . This result validates the hypothesis H 2. 
So , the presence of an outside director in the board of directors does not affect the financials stability of 
banks . This result confirms that found by Griffith et al (2002) , Adams et Mehran ( 2005) 
Which found a significant relationship between stability and board composition confirming our results . 
It appears as the stability of Islamic banks is not dependent to the presence of independent directors on their 
board of directors . 
The results of table11 , shows that the variable duality , the combination of the position of CEO and 
board chairman of directors , influences positively and significantly at 1% level the financial stability of Islamic 
banks . This contradicts the result found by Simpson et Gleason (1999) that showed that duality affect negatively 
and significantly the probability of financial distress of Islamic banks . 
This is an agreement with Godlewski (2005) which showed the authority granted by CEO duality is 
negatively related to risk taking in banks and thus positively relationship to financial stability in the past . These 
results allows us to reject the hypothesis H4. 
As for the variable “ presence of institutional investors “ , it positively and significantly impact 1% , the 
financial stability of Islamic banks . ( Table 6) 
These results corroborate those found by Hasan and Dridi ( 2012) who point out that the presence of 
institutional administrators the board helps to reduce bank risk . 
Thus , the presence of institutional administrators in the board of the banks is an effective means of 
control of the management of banking activities , given the expertise and competitiveness it brings . 
Then we accept the hypothesis , we also find that the variable coefficient of debt ratio is negative and 
statistically insignificant ( Table 6) , which validates our research hypothesis  
Thus the decrease in debt ratio in Islamic banks causes a decrease in its risk and therefore stability . 
This result corroborates that found by Hasan and Dridi (2012) which showed that banks are more stable when 
their debt ratio is low . 
The bank size variable has a positive but not significant impact on the financials stability of Islamic 
banks . This impact is negative on the financial stability of conventional banks . Thus , an increase in size causes 
the stability of Islamic banks , unlike conventional banks . 
Thus , the hypothesis H6 is rejected , this result corroborates that found by Saunders and al (1990) 
which stipulate that there is a negative relationship between bank risk and the bank size . They explain this result 
by the fact that large banks are suceptible to be more skilled in managing risks and also have better possibilities 
of diversification . 
The results of table 6 show that inflation has a negative and significant coefficient threshold 10% . 
It turns out as well as inflation causes the instability of Islamic banks . Therefore Hypothesis H7 is 
rejected . 
This result corroborates that found by Boyd and al (2000) that inflation has statistically and negative 
significant effect on the stability of the financial sector . So , inflation causes greater risk for Islamic banks . 
Furthermore , this result contradicts that found by Vong and Chan (2009) , which showed that inflation 
has a positive impact on Islamic banks . 
 
Conclusion  
Our empirical work has focused on the impact of board of directors on financial stability and the risk of 
conventional banks and Islamic banks . Our research was based on a comparative study between Islamic banks 
and conventional banks . 
To this end , this article has presented 3 sections . The first presented a review of empirical literature 
that deals primarily a comparison of the stability of Islamic banks and conventional banks . A second section 
illustrated the methodology of our research ( the sample , the different variable considered , assumptions and 
model ) , the third section presented the result and interpretations of sample of 40 banks belonging to the gulf 
countries over the period ( 2006…2010) . 
We have identified the following outcomes : 
-The variable size of board , duality , inflation influence significantly the financial stability of Islamic banks ( Z 
score ) threshold respectively at 1% , 5% , 10% . 
All other variables now have non significant effect on the financial stability of bank . Only one variable 
significantly impact the financial stability of conventional banks , it is the presence of institutional investors on 
the board of directors of banks . 
In addition , we found that the variable debt ratio negatively and significantly impact on the financial 
stability of Islamic banks . Thus , the debt ratio to decline within an Islamic banks causes a decrease in its risk 
and thus its stability . The Islamic banks are more stable when the debt ratio is low . 
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The bank size variable has a positif but not significant impact on the financial stability of Islamic banks . This 
effect is negative on financial stability of conventional banks . 
 
References  
-Adams .R , Mehran .H (2005) “ Is corporate governance different for bank holding companies?” Economic 
Policy Review , 4  , April , p123-142 
-Beltratti .A , Stulz .R ( 2009) “ Why did come banks perform better during the credit crisis?” A cross country 
study of the impact of governance and regulation “ ECGI’s Finance working paper , n°254 
-Boyd .J.H , Levine .R , Smith .B.D ( 2000)” The impact of inflation on financial sector performance “ Journal 
of Monetary Economics , 47, (2) , p221-248 
-Cihak.M, Hesse.M (2008) « Islamic banks and financial stability : an empirical analysis” International 
Monetary Fund , working paper  
-Duguet .E ( 2010)” Econométrie des panels avec applications » Revue d’Economie et statistique , p415-416 
-Godlewski .C.J (2005) “ Information ,organisation et prise de risque dans la banque » Université Robert , 
Thèse de doctorat science de gestion  
-Griffith .J.S  , Spratt .S , Segoviano .M ( 2001) “ Bale II and developing countries : diversification and 
portfolio effects “  
-Hausman .J.A (1978)” Specification tests in Econometrics” Econometrica , vol 46 , n°6, p1251-1271 
-Kok.Y.T , Yong .T.S , Siew .M , Ker .Wei .T (2012) “ The determinants of bank profitability in Malysia” 
-Molyneux .P, Thornton .J ( 1992) “ Determinants of European bank profitability : A note “ Journal of Banking 
and Finance , 16, 6, p1173-1178 
-Perry .P (1992) “ Do banks gain or lose from inflation ? “ Journal of Retail Banking , p25-30 
-Pi.L , Timme .S.G ( 1993) “ Corporate control and bank efficiency “ Journal of Banking and Finan , 17, p515-
530 
-Simpson .G.W , Gleason .A ( 1999) “ Board structure , ownership and financial distress in banking firms 
“ International Review of Economics and Finance , vol 8 , n°3, p281-292 
-Summer .S.W , Webb.E ( 2005) “ Does corporate governance determine bank loan portfolio choice ?” Journal 
of the Academy of Business and Economics  
-Vong .A.P.L , Chan .H.S ( 2009) “ Determinants of bank profitability in Macao “ Macau Monetary Research 
Bulletin , 12, (6)  , p93-113 
-Wasiuzzam .S , Gunasegavan .N.U ( 2013)“Comparative study of the performance of Islamic and 
conventional banks “ Humanomic , Vol 29 , n°1, p43-60 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
